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Abstract We examine the effects of an increase in income on the cohabitation and
marriage of single mothers. Using data from an experiment that resulted in randomly
assigned differences in child support receipt for welfare-receiving single mothers, we
find that exogenous income increases (as a result of receiving all child support that was
paid) are associated with significantly lower cohabitation rates between mothers and
men who are not the fathers of their child(ren). Overall, these results support the
hypothesis that additional income increases disadvantaged women’s economic indepen-
dence by reducing the need to be in the least stable type of partnerships. Our results also
show the potential importance of distinguishing between biological and social fathers.
Keywords Child support . Cohabitation . Independence hypothesis . Marriage .
Single mothers
Introduction
The potential impact on marriage of policies that increase economic resources is a topic
of longstanding interest for demographers and policy analysts (see, e.g., the classic
paper by Hannan et al. 1977). However, the relationship between economic resources
and partnering behavior may be changing (Sweeney 2002). Well-known trends that
affect the lives of children—our focus here—include substantial increases in cohabita-
tion (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008), declines in marriage (Cherlin 2009), new under-
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many “fragile” families (Carlson and England 2011; McLanahan 2011; McLanahan
and Beck 2010), and a new awareness of different types of family complexity (Carlson
and England 2011; Cherlin 2009; Thomson and McLanahan 2012). One type of family
complexity that may be particularly consequential for children is mothers who live with
a “social father” (i.e., a man who has not fathered any of her children); some research
suggests that social fathers are less involved with children than biological fathers
(Berger and Langton 2011). In this article, we reexamine the relationship between
economic resources and partnering, using more recent data and considering not only
marriage but also cohabitation—and, in particular, whether cohabitation is with a
biological father or social father.
These issues are particularly consequential for economically disadvantaged mothers
and their children. An additional dollar of income is likely to have a greater effect for
those with lower initial resources. Moreover, economically disadvantaged mothers are
the focus of much social policy. Part of the impetus for some of the more radical changes
in U.S. welfare policy has been a sense that the old welfare system promoted marital
dissolution, increased nonmarital births, and enabled unmarried mothers to remain single
(for a review of the mixed empirical results, see Moffitt 1998, 2003).1 Because of the
concern that programs that provide more economic resources inadvertently promote
single mothering, much recent U.S. policy aims to encourage marriage among single
mothers. In this context, the extent to which a mother’s economic resources influence her
marriage and cohabitation decisions has obvious implications for social policy.
As discussed later, any analysis of economic resources and partnering faces chal-
lenges in determining whether the relationship is causal and in identifying its direction.
In this article, we take advantage of a policy experiment that resulted in randomly
assigned differences in the amount of child support received among welfare participants
to investigate the effects of economic resources (in this case, from one source: child
support) on cohabitation and marriage. Because the differences in child support received
when it was paid are unrelated to any other factors, we can estimate a causal effect of
these additional economic resources. This research thus updates the prior research on the
effects of income on partnering, focusing on a particular type of income (child support)
among disadvantaged mothers and using superior methods and a nuanced measure of
partnering outcomes (marriage and cohabitation with biological and social fathers).
Prior Literature
Although substantial literature in sociology and economics has examined the effect of
income on union formation and family structure, determining a causal relationship is
complicated (for a review of the empirical research and the estimation difficulties, see
1 For example, the “Findings” section of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PL104-193) notes that, “The increase in the number of children receiving public assistance
is closely related to the increase in births to unmarried women. . . . The negative consequences of an out-of-
wedlock birth on the mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented.” It concludes that,
“Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, it is the sense of the Congress that
prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important
Government interests and the policy contained in part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act (as amended
by section 103(a) of this Act) is intended to address the crisis.”
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Burstein 2007). One critical difficulty is that individuals with different levels of income
may be different in a variety of unmeasured ways that are correlated with family
structure. For example, those who have difficulty maintaining commitments may be
more likely to transition in and out of relationships, and they may also be more likely to
transition in and out of employment, leading to lower overall income. A second issue is
that income and family structure are likely to have reciprocal relationships: family
structure clearly affects the resources available to an individual, and resources can
affect family structure. Third, partnering reflects a matching process involving at least
two actors; even if a given level of income increases an individual’s desire to be in a
partnership, there may not be an available and willing partner. The number of available
“marriageable” partners may affect union formation (e.g., Raley 1996). Finally, many
studies of the effects of income have examined the effects of earnings (rather than the
effect of income per se), which complicates the analysis because earnings levels may
reflect labor supply decisions associated with the expected stability of unions (Özcan
and Breen 2012), and the working conditions of the jobs typically available to
disadvantaged women may affect family formation (Joshi et al. 2009).
In this article, we are particularly interested in the effect of income on women who
are already single mothers, considering whether they marry, cohabit, or stay single—
and, if they cohabit, whether it is with a man who is the biological father of at least one
of her children. In the sections that follow, we summarize three categories of recent
research that focuses on (1) the effects of income on transitions from being unpartnered
to marriage and cohabitation, (2) the effects of income on transitions from cohabitation
to marriage, and (3) the effects of income on the type of cohabitation (with a
biological or social father). Within each section, we review available theory; and
because we want to pay particular attention to research regarding low-income
mothers, we discuss research on welfare and child support income in particular,
as well as income in general.
Effect of Income on Transitions to Partnerships
Theory is ambiguous regarding the likely effects of economic resources on entering a
romantic partnership, whether cohabitation or marriage. The most common approach
assumes an independence effect: because additional income reduces the need for a
woman to find a partner with whom she can pool resources, income is assumed to make
her more independent and less likely to partner (Burstein 2007; Bzostek et al. 2012;
Carlson et al. 2004b; Cherlin 1992).2 Alternatively, increases in income may lead to
increases in cohabitation or marriage if they make a woman a more attractive partner
(e.g., Carlson et al. 2004a; Oppenheimer 1997). Finally, there may be no relationship:
small amounts of additional income may not matter if a woman is receiving income-
tested welfare benefits and thus loses benefits with additional income. Moreover, even
given a relationship between income and marriage, there may be no relationship for
2 A closely related, but distinct, argument suggests that women’s increasing opportunities in the paid labor
market lead to lower rates of marriage because the economic gains from specializing (i.e., the potential gains
from allowing, for example, the man to work more hours in the market and the woman to concentrate on home
production) have been eroded (Becker 1981). The economic independence argument focused on specialization
is less relevant to our interests in the effects of an increase in child support or other unearned income—a
change that is not directly related to wages.
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cohabitation; some researchers argue that the factors related to the transition to cohab-
itation are substantially different from the factors related to the transition to marriage
(e.g., Reed 2006).
Several authors have concluded that although the economic independence arguments
have some theoretical support, the empirical evidence is weak (e.g., Burstein 2007;
McLaughlin and Lichter 1997; Oppenheimer 1997; White and Rogers 2000). The
argument suggests that those with the fewest resources should be most likely to be
partnered; this is not the pattern typically observed in straightforward comparisons (e.g.,
White and Rogers 2000) or in more sophisticated empirical analyses (e.g., Aassve 2003;
Carlson et al. 2004a; Clarkberg 1999; Gibson-Davis 2009; Goldscheider and Sassler
2006; Joshi et al. 2009; Lichter et al. 1992; Raley 1996; Sassler and Schoen 1999;
Schneider 2011; Sweeney 2002; Thornton et al. 1995; Xie et al. 2003). The research on
entries into unions in general (often treating marriage and cohabitation as competing
risks) and research focusing specifically on entering cohabitation generally shows a
weak relationship between economic resources on these transitions; when there are
associations, men’s resources seem more important than women’s (e.g., Carlson et al.
2004a; Clarkberg 1999; Goldscheider and Sassler 2006; Raley 1996). Moreover, with
respect to marriage, a recent review (Burstein 2007) concluded that studies of individ-
uals find either that women’s resources are not associated with the transition to marriage
or that women with higher earnings, education, or income have an increased likelihood
of marriage, in contrast with the expectations of the independence hypothesis. However,
few of these studies have attempted to control for unmeasured factors.
A substantial literature focusing on lower-income mothers has examined the effect
of a particular income source—specifically, welfare income—on marriage. Welfare
income may have similar effects to other types of income, an independence effect that
makes it less likely to partner, and a marriage market effect that makes it more likely to
partner. However, the effect of welfare income is complicated because those who marry
are less likely to be eligible for some programs. A typical approach uses variations in
state benefit levels to see whether transitions to marriage were more likely or less likely
in states with more generous benefits (Moffitt 1998; for a review, see Moffitt 2003).
This research has generally found no effects or very small effects of welfare policy
(although for an alternate finding, see Knab et al. 2009). In another line of research,
evaluations of several welfare reform initiatives have tested whether changes to the
amount of welfare benefits and other changes to welfare rules have affected marriage
rates for single mothers using random-assignment designs, which should control for the
unmeasured variables that have been a limitation of most previous work. A meta-
analysis of 14 of the random-assignment studies (Gennetian and Knox 2003) found no
overall effects of these reforms on marriage, nor did they find consistent effects on
marriage among subgroups. Part of the reason for limited effects may be that the
reforms typically combine many changes, some of which may have increased marriage
rates and some of which may have decreased marriage rates. Although the welfare
reform studies have generally shown no effects on marriage, some individual studies—
especially those that provided more income—have found effects, either overall or
among some subgroups (see Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa 2006; Gennetian et al.
2005; Harknett and Gennetian 2003). The effects, with those receiving more income
being more likely to marry, were particularly large among women who were most
disadvantaged (Gennetian and Knox 2003). Putting together the experimental research
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with a variety of nonexperimental studies leads to an overall conclusion that the effects
of welfare programs on marriage or cohabitation are likely small (Burstein 2007).
A much smaller literature has explored the effects of child support income on
transitions to marriage and cohabitation. Carlson et al. (2004a) argued that child support
enforcement has potentially competing effects: child support, like any other income
source, makes low-income single mothers more able to live independently, but it also
could make them more attractive in the marriage (or cohabitation) market. An addi-
tional complication is that having to pay child support increases the incentives for
fathers to live with the mothers of their children, so strong enforcement of child support
may be associated with increased marriage to a father. Carlson and colleagues (2004a)
found in some empirical models that couples are more likely to be married if child
support enforcement is higher, and this result is consistent with other studies finding
that more child support enforcement is associated with lower divorce rates (Nixon
1997) and increased marriage among those who are already parents (Acs and Nelson
2004). However, Carlson and colleagues’ (2004a) findings were not consistent across
models. Similarly, Knab et al. (2009) found no effect of child support policies on the
likelihood of marriage among couples who already had a nonmarital birth together but
who were not cohabiting at the time of the birth. One review concludes that the findings
on the effects of child support on marriage and divorce are quite mixed (Pirog and Ziol-
Guest 2006), reflecting the absence of consistent effects across models found by some
authors (Carlson et al. 2004a; Knab et al. 2009) as well as findings that child support is
associated with increased marriage (Acs and Nelson 2004; Nixon 1997), no effect on
marriage (Heim 2003), and decreased marriage (Knab et al. 2009).
Effect of Income on Transitions From Cohabitation to Marriage
Some studies have examined the relationship between income and the transition to
marriage among women currently cohabiting (e.g., Brown 2000; Duvander 1999;
Gibson-Davis 2009; Manning and Smock 1995; Sassler and McNally 2003; Smock
and Manning 1997; Wu and Pollard 2000). Economic resources could affect this transi-
tion because married couples are treated differently from cohabiting couples by the tax
and transfer system; however, whether a couple would havemore or fewer resources were
they to marry differs widely across couples, making simple statements about the general
effect of marriage difficult (Burstein 2007). Recent qualitative research has emphasized
that higher income may provide the economic resources that some couples believe are
necessary to marry, rather than cohabit (Edin 2000; Gibson-Davis et al. 2005; Smock
et al. 2005), an issue that is likely to be particularly salient for lower-income women.
In an early study, subsequently confirmed by a number of additional quantitative
studies, Smock and Manning (1997) showed no effect of the economic resources of a
cohabiting woman on her transition to marriage; however, cohabiting men with higher
earnings are more likely to marry. Similarly, a woman’s employment status is not related
to the transition to marriage among low-income cohabiting women (Lichter et al. 2006).
Turning to research on particular sources of income, welfare benefits have no
relationship to the rate of marriage among cohabitors with low income (Lichter et al.
2006). The experimental studies, even those that have found some effects of welfare on
marriage, do not show that increased welfare income for women already cohabiting is
associated with transitions to marriage (Gennetian 2003). Because child support is
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seldom pursued when two parents cohabit or are married, the level of child support
enforcement should not have a large effect on the transition to marriage among couples
who are cohabiting. However, Knab et al. (2009) found that more child support
enforcement was associated with a lower likelihood of transitioning from cohabitation
to marriage. Looking at the research as a whole, we find little quantitative evidence to
date that a cohabiting woman’s resources, either in general or of a particular type, have
a strong effect on the likelihood of marriage.
Effects of Income on Type of Cohabitation
Cherlin and Fomby (2004) made an important contribution in distinguishing types of
cohabitors, differentiating women cohabitingwith a father of at least one of their children
from those who are cohabiting with someone who is not a father of one of their children.
In examining living arrangements for low-income mothers, they found in their baseline
survey that cohabiting with a biological father is more common than cohabiting with a
social father. By the second wave of their survey, though, cohabiting with a social father
was more common. Cohabiting relationships of all types are unstable, regardless of
whether they have produced children (e.g., Kennedy and Bumpass 2008). Relatively few
researchers have followed the lead of Cherlin and Fomby in separating types of
cohabitation between those with biological and those with social fathers (although see,
e.g., Manning and Brown 2006), and we are not aware of recent research that examines
the relationship between income and these types of cohabitation.
Summary
Reviewing the theoretical and empirical research, the effect of economic resources on
partnering has clearly been an important topic for researchers across multiple disci-
plines. However, research on the effect of income on the partnering of disadvantaged
single mothers, while a central focus of policy debates, has received less focused
attention. Much of the extant literature does not fully differentiate between lower-
income and higher-income women, or does not differentiate between those who are
already mothers and those who are not. Moreover, much research is focused on the
effects of income on union dissolution rather than formation; much of the policy
discussion, in contrast, focuses on those who are already single parents. Perhaps most
importantly, the current literature is limited in its ability to disentangle factors that may
be related to both partnering and economic resources. Finally, although some literature
has explicitly considered cohabitation, little research has followed Cherlin and Fomby
(2004) in trying to differentiate types of cohabitation. This article reports the results of
an analysis of outcomes for low-income mothers exposed to a unique random-
assignment experiment that allows us to address some of these limitations. Before
presenting our analysis, we discuss the context of this experiment.
Policy Context
Because single-parent families have historically been economically vulnerable, several
government programs have been designed to increase their incomes. Most public
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attention has focused on the traditional cash welfare program, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), which was replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) in the welfare reform of 1996. Welfare reform was influenced by a
sense that the old income-support scheme, in which eligibility for many supports was
restricted to single-parent families, encouraged separations and nonmarital births be-
cause more resources were available to single-parent families than to two-parent
families. Similarly, concerns existed that programs such as AFDC, which gave addi-
tional resources to those with larger families, encouraged additional births, particularly
nonmarital births. TANF responded to these issues by (1) allowing states to choose to
provide the same benefits regardless of the number of adults in the home, (2) giving
states the freedom to keep benefits constant regardless of the number of children, and
(3) providing incentive payments to states that reduced nonmarital births. Other
provisions of TANF also responded to criticisms of AFDC: because federal programs
were seen as too inflexible and bureaucratic, states were given great freedom to design
their own TANF programs. In addition, because providing income for an unlimited
period of time was seen as serving to keep single mothers out of the labor force, TANF
programs were time-limited and focused on requiring work in exchange for benefits.
The other major social policy affecting single-parent families is child support. When
children live with only one biological parent, the nonresident parent (usually the father)3
is typically required to pay child support to the resident parent (usually the mother) to
contribute to child-rearing expenses. A public child support agency in every state helps
to locate nonresident parents and establish child support orders, collects child support
paid primarily through wage withholding, and then distributes that support to the
resident-parent family. Child support orders typically do not change if a single parent
(re)marries or begins to cohabit with a new partner.4
Child support and TANF are strongly related; in fact, early child support policy was
designed primarily as a tool to recoup (or prevent) welfare expenditures on children
(Garfinkel et al. 1998). The 1996 welfare reform that created TANF also allowed states
to set their own rules for what happens when child support is paid for a family receiving
TANF. In most states, any child support paid by the nonresident father when the mother
is receiving TANF is retained by the government and used to defray the costs of public
assistance, rather than being distributed to the family (Cancian et al. 2008). Some states
instead maintained the pre-reform policy of allowing the resident mother to receive the
first $50 of child support paid each month (a $50 “pass-through”) and retaining only
amounts above that limit (Cancian et al. 2007). One state—Wisconsin—has adopted a
unique policy, allowing most mothers to keep all the child support paid by the father
but without that support affecting the level of cash welfare received by the mother and
her family. This policy was implemented as part of the state’s TANF program,
3 For simplicity, in this article, we use gendered language and refer to nonresident parents as “fathers” and
resident parents as “mothers.” Child support policies and income support policies are not explicitly gendered,
and rights and responsibilities are assigned by residential status. However, particularly among low-income
families (including those participating in welfare programs), most resident parents are mothers, and most
nonresident parents are fathers (Grall 2011).
4 For recent research on changes to child support orders, see Ha et al. (2010). In the United States, child
support orders are typically based on the personal income of the biological parent, not their family income
(Gold-Bikin and Hammond 1994); and, in contrast to some other countries, child support orders generally do
not differ based on the family status of either parent (Meyer et al. 2012; Skinner et al. 2007).
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Wisconsin Works (W-2). The child support component of W-2 was the subject of an
experimental evaluation, with a random sample of TANF recipients and applicants
assigned to a control group and receiving only partial child support (the first $50 per
month or 41 % of the amount paid, whichever was more) whenever they received
TANF, and those in an experimental group receiving all current child support paid,
regardless of TANF receipt. The evaluation was in effect until July 2002, when all cases
began to receive all child support paid on their behalf.
We use the variation in child support received by the control and experimental
groups that was caused by random assignment to identify the effect of child support
income on subsequent marriage and cohabitation. This strategy depends on the suc-
cessful implementation of random assignment, which was documented as part of the
original Child Support Demonstration Evaluation technical report (for details, see
Cancian et al. 2001). Families were assigned to the experimental and control groups
based on a randomly distributed digit of the mother’s Social Security number. Families
in the experimental group received more child support as a direct mechanical effect of
the policy change, but assignment status was consequential only for those receiving
TANF cash benefits and child support in the same month. TANF participation tended to
be short, and child support receipt was irregular. Nonetheless, although the difference in
income is fairly modest, it provides an opportunity to test the causal effects of an
exogenous increase in family income.
A random-assignment experiment provides an estimate of the total effect of an
increase in child support income, but the effect could be realized through a number of
pathways. For example, if a mother received increased child support income, it could
make her less desperate to find someone with whom she can share expenses, or it could
increase her sense of control over her life—and either outcome could make her more
selective in partnering. The experiment offers a distinct advantage for estimating whether
income has an effect but does not allow us to identify the particular pathway (e.g.,
whether the effect comes through less economic need or increased sense of control).
In summary, the random-assignment experiment means that the two groups of low-
income single mothers should be identical except that one group receives more child
support income than the other. This enables us to contribute to the debate about whether
income causes changes in partnering behavior (and thus living arrangements) for this
vulnerable population.
Data, Sample, and Methods
Our sample includes mothers who entered the Wisconsin TANF program (W-2) in its
first 10 months of operation, between September 1997 and July 1998. We use merged
administrative records drawn from the welfare, child support, and Unemployment
Insurance systems, merged through Social Security numbers (Cook and Brown
2001). We also use information available for a random sample of the control and
experimental groups from the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families (SWWF).
Our primary sample includes mothers who responded to the third wave of the
SWWF (n = 709), which included measures of family structure and living arrange-
ments. The original survey sample was drawn from the W-2 administrative records and
is linked to it (Krecker 2001). Of the original sample drawn for the survey, 91 %
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responded to at least one of the two first waves of the survey and were thus eligible for
the third wave; for the third wave, a random sample of one-third of those eligible was
selected, and 82 % responded (Krecker 2005). The third wave was collected in the
spring and summer of 2004. Using detailed administrative data available for both
respondents and nonrespondents, weights were created to account for nonresponse
(see Ziliak 2004) and are used here. Because our primary interest is those who were not
married when they entered W-2 in 1997–1998, we exclude 35 mothers who the
administrative records show were married and two mothers with missing marital status
at that time, leaving a final sample of 672. We do this because we would like to
differentiate the effect of income on getting married from that of staying married, and
there are too few cases who were married when they enteredW-2 to analyze separately.5
Because the administrative data on cohabitation are unreliable, our base sample includes
both those who were single and those living with a cohabitor.6
Table 1 reports basic demographic characteristics for mothers at the point when they
enteredW-2 as well as their recent work, welfare, and child support history. The first set
of columns shows the results for the full sample, followed by results for the experi-
mental and control groups separately. As expected, given successful random assign-
ment, there are no significant differences in the distribution of baseline characteristics
of the experimental and control groups, nor were there differences in prior welfare use,
prior employment, or prior child support. Most mothers were in their 20s. Almost two-
thirds of mothers in the full sample were black, and one-quarter were white. Many
mothers had low levels of formal education: 54 % of the full sample had not completed
high school, and only 10 % had more than a high school education. At the time they
entered W-2, most mothers had one or two children, but 36 % of the full sample had
three or more. Most women had at least one young child; only one-fourth of the full
sample had no preschool children. In about one-fifth of all cases, the child support
system official records of paternity show that the mother had had children with
more than one father. Most mothers lived in Milwaukee County, the primary
urban county in the state.
At entry to W-2, more than one-half the mothers were longer-term AFDC partici-
pants. In the two years before entering W-2, more than 80 % of mothers had some
formal employment experience, as measured by earnings recorded in the
Unemployment Insurance system; and 13 % of the full sample had worked in every
quarter. Most women had a child support order in place at entry, although only 23 %
had child support paid on behalf of their family in the prior year, and only 10 %
of the full sample had at least $1,000 paid on their behalf in the prior year.
Nonetheless, when child support was paid, it averaged about $100 per month.
Overall, the descriptive statistics show a group of mothers who are disadvantaged
on several dimensions.
5 Including the 35 mothers who were married at entry would provide similar results. Although none of our
main results that were even marginally significant change in sign, some results that were not marginally
statistically significant become so with the larger sample. The most important is that in one of the subgroups—
namely, those who did not receive AFDC in the prior two years—women in the experimental group were
marginally less likely to be married (p = .07).
6 If we were to exclude the 65 mothers who the administrative records show as not married but who were
living with an unrelated male who was within 10 years of her age (a potential cohabitor), the main conclusions
would be identical.
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Table 1 Mothers’ characteristics and program participation at entry to W-2
Total Experimental Control
N Weighted % N Weighted % N Weighted %
Age (p = .1611)
<20 years 91 12.6 53 15.3 38 10.1
20–29 years 370 55.7 161 52.5 209 58.4
30–39 years 173 26.6 88 28.0 85 25.6
40 years and older 38 5.1 15 4.2 23 5.9
Race (p = .2000)
White 196 24.1 84 21.2 112 27.0
Black 425 66.3 205 68.1 220 64.6
Hispanic 30 5.8 15 5.6 15 6.0
Other 21 3.8 13 5.2 8 2.4
Education (p = .7490)
Less than high school 338 53.6 165 55.0 173 51.9
High school 257 36.8 119 35.8 138 38.1
More than high school 77 9.6 33 9.2 44 10.0
Number of Children (p = .1129)
0 (pregnant at entry to W-2) 11 0.9 4 0.6 7 1.3
1 249 34.9 120 35.5 129 34.2
2 187 27.9 76 24.2 111 31.4
3 or more 225 36.3 117 39.7 108 33.1
Age of Youngest Child (p = .3211)
0–2 years (includes those pregnant at entry) 401 57.8 190 58.9 211 56.9
3–5 years 115 17.7 59 19.1 56 16.5
6–12 years 127 20.3 52 17.2 75 23.1
13–17 years 29 4.2 16 4.8 13 3.6
Number of (legal) Fathers (p = .7899)
0 182 25.0 86 19.7 96 24.3
1 369 56.0 169 54.6 200 57.4
2 121 19.0 62 25.7 59 18.3
County (p = .5345)
Milwaukee 474 76.3 226 77.0 248 75.8
Other Urban 121 15.3 51 13.8 70 16.6
Rural 77 8.4 40 9.2 37 7.7
Number of Months of AFDC Receipt in Prior 24 months (p = .5017)
No AFDC 150 13.5 66 12.7 84 14.3
1–18 months 238 32.4 110 30.8 128 33.8
19–24 months 284 54.1 141 56.4 143 51.9
Quarters Employed of the 8 Quarters Before Entry (p = .1230)
0 quarters 84 15.1 38 14.7 46 15.5
1–4 quarters 250 43.1 107 38.7 143 47.2
5–7 quarters 215 29.4 112 33.5 103 25.5
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Empirical Approach and Method
Our basic approach is to examine whether unmarried mothers randomly assigned to the
experimental group (who received the full amount of child support paid on their behalf)
have different partnering from those assigned to the control group (who received only a
portion when they were receiving W-2). Any differences would provide evidence of a
causal effect of income (in this case, child support) on mothers’ partnering. To validate
this analytic strategy, we must confirm that random assignment worked—that is, that
individuals in the experimental and control groups did not differ from each other at the
entry into the program except by chance. In addition to the comparison of descriptive
statistics for our analytic sample in Table 1, a variety of analyses demonstrate that
random assignment worked and that the experimental and control groups are equiva-
lent.7 Second, we must confirm that the intervention worked—that is, that the exper-
imental group actually received more child support than the control group. As reported
by Cancian et al. (2008), mothers in the experimental group received over 20 % more
support in the first year, decreasing to 12 % more in the third year. This effect is due
both to more support being paid on behalf of families in the experimental group (fathers
being more likely to pay, and paying higher average amounts) and to mothers in the
experimental group receiving more of the child support that was paid. Although the
experimental effect declines over time as more control-group mothers move off welfare
and begin to receive the full amount of child support paid on their behalf, the effects for
those new to the welfare system are larger and grow over time.
7 Cases receiving AFDC on August 31, 1997, were randomly assigned to the experimental or control group on
that date; cases applying for W-2 were given a random-assignment code on application. Cases in the
experimental and control groups entered the W-2 program at equivalent rates; that is, there was no differential
diversion. Further, there was no difference in rates of entry to W-2 in the group in which differential diversion
would have been most likely: among those with child support amounts of more than $1,000 in the previous
year, experimental-group and control-group members entered at the same rate. An analysis of whether a wide
variety of characteristics can be used to predict experimental-group status shows that only three of 33 variables
are statistically significantly related (p < .05) to being in the experimental group, which is not many more than
the number that would be predicted by chance. As described later, we control for the variables shown to
predict experimental-group status. See Cancian et al. (2001) for more details.
Table 1 (continued)
Total Experimental Control
N Weighted % N Weighted % N Weighted %
8 quarters 123 12.5 60 13.1 63 11.8
Child Support Order/Payments on Behalf of Family in Prior 12 months
(p = .7061)
No order 281 41.3 131 42.3 150 40.5
Order but no child support paid 237 36.1 111 35 126 36.9
$1–999 CS paid 82 12.5 42 13.6 40 11.4
$1,000 or more CS paid 72 10.1 33 9.1 39 11.2
Notes: The p values for a Pearson χ2 test of the difference between the experimental and control group are in
parentheses.
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Having established that those in the full child-support (experimental) group are not
substantially different at entry from the control group but that they do receive more
child support, we now turn to an examination of whether being in the full child-support
group is related to partnering—that is, to marriage and cohabitation patterns. We
examine living arrangements at the time of the third-wave interview, in 2004, about
6.5 years after random assignment. We divide mothers into four categories based on
mothers’ self-reports. At the time of the third-wave interview, 11 % of mothers were
married, 72 % were single (no partner), 7 % were cohabiting with a father of one of
their children, and 10 % were cohabiting with someone who is not a father of one of
their children (a “social father”).
For mothers who were cohabiting, we distinguish between fathers and nonfathers
based on the report of the mother, regardless of when a child was born or whether
paternity has been formally established. For those mothers who were married, we do
not distinguish between being married to a father and nonfather for two reasons. First,
because relatively few mothers were married, we do not have the sample size to support
estimates that distinguish between husbands who were fathers and those who were not.
Second, although biological and nonbiological fathers may behave differently (Hofferth
2006; Hofferth and Anderson 2003), marriage is associated with more stable unions
(Bumpass and Lu 2000) and greater pooling of resources than cohabitation (Hamplova
and Le Broudais 2009; Winkler 1997), and we expect biological ties to be less
important to the distribution of resources within marriage than within cohabiting unions
(Berger et al. 2008).
Given valid random assignment, the cases in the experimental and control groups are
equivalent in all ways except for being exposed to a different policy regime. As a result, a
simple comparison of partnership status could be used to test the effect of having more
income. We nonetheless control for selected covariates in a multinomial logit regression
because using control variables providesmore precise estimates of the relationship between
experimental group status and our outcome of interest. Control variables also account for
any chance differences between the experimental and control groups. Control variables
include mother’s age, race, education, the age of her youngest child, whether the mother
had more than $1,000 in child support paid on her behalf in the year prior to enteringW-2,
urban/rural status, and variations in the period of random assignment (which differentiates
AFDC recipients at the time of transition from those who applied to TANF later).8
For ease of interpretation, we also use the multinomial logit regression coefficients to
calculate regression-adjusted proportions of the various categories of partnership status
among the experimental and control groups. We do this by calculating the predicted
probability that an experimental-group mother will be in each category, using the coeffi-
cients from the model and the weighted mean for each control variable; then we repeat the
calculation for the control group. We then compare the proportions of experimental- and
control-group members in each living arrangement category, using a t test.9
8 This list of control variables includes all those used to determine regression-adjusted differences between the
experimental and control groups in the final evaluation of the child support reform (see Meyer and Cancian
2001: 29−30).
9 If the means of control variables were equal in the experimental and control groups, the significance of the
experimental group coefficient should be equivalent to the significance of the difference in the estimated
proportions. Because there are small differences in the means of the control variables, the significance of
proportions can be slightly different.
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We are particularly interested in any differential effects of additional income for
three subgroups. First, we estimate the effect of the policy on a subgroup for which
child support income might be especially salient, given their own limited earnings
potential: women with less than a high school education when they entered W-2. This
subgroup may be particularly relevant in testing the hypothesized effect of economic
independence: they might be most likely to partner for economic reasons, and thus
additional resources might cause them to be more likely to be unpartnered.
A second subgroup of interest is mothers who had no history of AFDC receipt in the
two years prior to entering W-2. We are particularly interested in this subgroup for two
reasons. First, long-term welfare participants may have characteristics that make them
unlike other single mothers, and thus examining new participants provides more
generalizable results. Moreover, time limits on receiving benefits were instituted under
welfare reform, which means that there will be very few long-term recipients in the
future. Second, the experimental effect on child support receipts is larger for new
participants, perhaps because they had no recent experience with having child support
retained (Cancian et al. 2008). This may increase our ability to detect the effects of
income on living arrangements among this group.
Our last subgroup of interest is mothers of younger children. We are interested in this
group, first, because any changes in living arrangements will affect these children for a
longer proportion of their childhood. Second, mothers caring for young children face
high child care costs if they work, which may make them particularly responsive to
changes in income that are unrelated to earnings. Finally, mothers of young children
may be more likely than other mothers to be open to having an additional child, which
may change their partnering patterns.
Results
Table 2 reports the basic experimental results; we primarily focus on the first row,
showing the effect of belonging to the experimental group. Six years after random
assignment, mothers who are able to receive the full child support paid (the experi-
mental group) are somewhat less likely to be cohabiting with a social father (a man who
has not fathered any of her children) (p < .06). Translating the coefficients into
predicted probabilities, 6.7 % of mothers in the experimental group are predicted to
be cohabiting with a social father, compared with 11.2 % of those in the control group.
As shown in the table, there is no statistically significant difference between the
experimental and control groups in either the probability of being married or cohabiting
with the father of one of her children. Calculating the predicted probability of being in
each group reveals that the omitted category—remaining single—does show a differ-
ence between the experimental and control groups: 79.3 % of the experimental group,
compared with 72.9 % of the control group, is predicted to be single and not cohabiting
(p < .09). Thus, the exogenous increase in income marginally reduced the proportion of
mothers cohabiting with a man who is not the father of any of her children but
increased the proportion who remained single.
The coefficients on the control variables are typically in the expected directions.
African American mothers are significantly less likely to be married or to be in either of
the cohabiting groups; thus, they are most likely to be unpartnered. Those with the
Testing the Economic Independence Hypothesis 869
oldest children are least likely to be cohabiting with a man who is a father, perhaps
reflecting the instability of cohabiting relationships. Those whose youngest child was
between ages 3 and 5 at entry into W-2 are more likely to be married. Those with less
education and older mothers are less likely to be cohabiting with a social father. There
are no detectable differences based on the level of child support before W-2 entry, nor
are there differences between those living in Milwaukee County (the largest urban
county in the state) and other regions.
To further test the hypothesized effect of economic independence, we estimate the
effect of the policy on several subgroups. Given smaller sample sizes for the subgroups,
some reduction in statistical significance might be expected. We begin by focusing on a
group for which child support income might be especially salient, given their own
limited earnings potential: women with less than a high school education when they
entered W-2. As shown in Table 3, among those with less than a high school education,
mothers in the experimental group are less likely to cohabit with nonfathers.
Transforming the coefficients reveals estimates of 5.6% of experimental-groupmothers,
compared with 11.2 % of control-group mothers (p < .08), are predicted to be cohabiting
with a social father. This result is consistent with the result for all mothers and has a
comparable level of statistical significance despite the much smaller sample size.
The second panel examines the marriage and cohabitation patterns for the 150
mothers who had no history of AFDC receipt in the two years prior to entering W-2.
Table 2 Multinomial model of living arrangements, full sample
Married Cohabiting, Father Cohabiting, Nonfather
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Experimental Group –0.247 0.287 –0.137 0.338 –0.586† 0.310
Child Support History in Year Prior to Entering W-2
$1,000 or more paid on behalf of family 0.149 0.445 –0.666 0.548 0.070 0.420
Age >30 Years –0.521 0.428 –0.691 0.495 –0.680† 0.376
African American –1.183** 0.344 –1.106* 0.438 –0.891* 0.385
Education (vs. less than high school)
High school 0.390 0.311 –1.060* 0.415 –0.361 0.350
More than high school 0.712 0.440 –0.728 0.688 0.811* 0.404
Region (vs. Milwaukee)
Other urban county –0.075 0.399 0.107 0.504 –0.282 0.458
Rural county 0.186 0.458 0.353 0.589 0.509 0.503
Age of Youngest (vs. <3 years)
Age 3–5 years 0.718* 0.366 0.168 0.468 0.350 0.390
Age 6 or more years 0.278 0.456 –1.793* 0.792 0.489 0.382
Intercept –1.340** 0.388 –0.877* 0.413 –1.213** 0.428
Log-Likelihood –559.09
Notes: Model also controls for period entering W-2, a proxy for long-term receipt; there are no statistically
significant estimates. A Hausman-McFadden test suggests the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
assumption has not been violated.
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Testing the Economic Independence Hypothesis 873
Similar to the overall results and the results for those with low education, the estimated
difference in the likelihood of cohabitation with nonfathers is statistically significant.
Moreover, after we transform the coefficients, we see that experimental-group mothers
without a history of AFDC receipt were more likely to be single (unpartnered) than
their counterparts in the control group (95 % compared with 86 % for the control
group). The relatively large effects among mothers without a history of AFDC receipt
are consistent with findings from the main evaluation for other outcomes. Nonetheless,
the point estimates should be interpreted with caution given small sample sizes.
Although the sign and statistical significance of the effects are robust, the point
estimates are sensitive to alternative specifications.
Finally, we also examine those whose youngest child was younger than age 6 at the
time of entry to W-2, a group whose changes in partnering may be particularly
consequential for their children. Similar to the other results, within mothers with
preschool children, the women in the experimental group are less likely to be cohab-
iting with a nonfather several years later (p < .02). In all three subgroups, the control
variables tend to show similar results.
In summary, when we compare mothers in the experimental and control
groups, we find that mothers eligible to receive more child support are less
likely to cohabit with men who are not fathers of any of the mothers’ children.
This result holds across subgroups of interest. In the sample as a whole, and in
the subgroup of mothers with no recent AFDC history at the time of entry to
W-2, those in the experimental group were more likely to be single. There are
no significant differences in the probability of being married in the sample as a
whole nor in any of the subgroups tested.
Discussion
In the 35 years since Hannan et al. (1977) used evidence from a random-assignment
experiment to argue that cash benefits provided to low-income families led to increases
in marital dissolution, a substantial literature has addressed the relationship between
economic resources and romantic partnerships. The demographic context has changed
substantially in the intervening years (Cherlin 2009). Nonmarital births now constitute
more than 40 % of all births (Hamilton et al. 2011), and a higher percentage of births
are to low-income women, highlighting the importance of understanding partnering
transitions for single mothers. Growth in cohabitation (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008)
and multiple-partner fertility (e.g., Cancian et al. 2011; Meyer et al. 2005) have also
increased the importance of understanding partnering beyond marriage as well as
partnerships with fathers versus other men.
The results presented here take advantage of a recent random-assignment experi-
ment to evaluate the economic independence hypothesis and its relevance in the new
demographic context. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that additional
economic resources (in this case, increased child support) increase a mother’s economic
independence and reduce her need to partner in order to make ends meet: mothers in the
experimental group are more likely to be single. Moreover, the increase in singleness is
not offset by detectable decreases in marriage or cohabitation in general but only in the
likelihood of cohabiting with a nonfather.
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Although the estimated effect for the full sample is marginally statistically signifi-
cant (p < .10), the findings regarding reduced cohabitation with social fathers among
those in the experimental group are robust to alternative sets of regression adjustments
and persist across all tested subgroups. As was found for many other outcomes in the
original evaluation (Meyer and Cancian 2001), the effect (i.e., reduced cohabitation in
the experimental group) is particularly strong among families new to the welfare
system. These families may have been more responsive to the new policy because of
less exposure to the previous system or because of other differences among new and
continuing or returning participants.
The effects are particularly notable given the limited difference in the treatment
received by those in the experimental and control groups. Those in the experimental
group received all current child support paid, regardless of their W-2 participation status.
Those in the control group received only part of the child support paid on their behalf,
beginning with their entry to W-2 (in 1997 or 1998) until they stopped receiving TANF,
or until the policy changed in 2002. Thus, the experimental assignment directly affected
receipt of child support for a fairly short period for most participants. Moreover, the
policy change affected the incomes of only those for whom child support was actually
paid—about one-half of the mothers. Finally, the magnitude of the increase in support is
modest: mothers in the experimental group were about three percentage points more
likely to receive support in the first year and received 23 % more support, but the effect
declined over time (Cancian et al. 2008). For all these reasons, the estimated effects of
the policy on family structure are likely to be conservative.
The power of random assignment gives us confidence that we have identified a
difference in partnering behavior caused by the policy difference that resulted in more
child support for one group than the other. Earlier, we noted that an experiment is well
suited for identifying a total effect but not the precise pathways. Random assignment
assures that the difference in outcomes is not due to preexisting or unmeasured
differences between the two groups, so it is a very powerful design. However, studies
using random assignment are less strong at identifying how the intervention changed
behavior. As a result, the change in partnering could be the result of some indirect
effects of the policy rather than just a direct effect of the change in income. For
example, fathers who know that the child support that they pay directly benefits their
children may be encouraged to take more responsibility for their children in other ways,
and the increased connections between fathers and their children could then lead to
more connections between fathers and the mothers of their children. It is possible that
increased connections could affect mothers’ partnering behavior—not as a result of the
increased income per se but because the policy change caused changes in fathers’
attitudes. Another possibility is that when the mother receives the full amount of child
support paid by the father, parents may have less conflict over whether the father is
fulfilling his responsibilities. Less conflict between the parents could make it more
likely for the parents to live together and less likely for either parent to form a new
romantic partnership; alternatively, the lack of a conflictual previous relationship may
make both parents more attractive partners for others, perhaps increasing the likelihood
of their marrying or cohabiting with a new partner. Again, if the new policy causes less
conflict and the lowered conflict affects partnering, the experimental group could have
different partnering behavior from the control group, but it would not necessarily be the
result of more income per se, but instead due to an indirect effect of the policy change.
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One way to explore the evidence for these alternate explanations is to see if there are
differences between the experimental group and the control group in the intermediate
steps in the hypothesized causal chain. This is not a perfect test because even if there
are differences, it would still be possible that the intermediate steps were themselves the
result of additional child support income. The main evaluation (Meyer and Cancian
2001) found no overall difference between the experimental and control groups in the
number of days of contact between nonresident fathers and a focal child, the extent to
which fathers looked after the focal child so that the mother could go to work or school
or look for work, or the extent to which mothers reported that the father was doing a
good job as a parent (all p > 0.20). On all these intermediate variables, there was no
effect in either the first year or the second year of the experiment. In the first year, but
not the second, there was a small difference (p = 0.09) in that experimental-group
mothers were less likely to report high conflict on at least one child-rearing issue
(Meyer and Cancian 2001). The mixed findings on conflict hint that the experimental
group’s lower likelihood of living with a social father (and increased likelihood of
remaining single) could be due to the difference in treatment of child support leading to
less conflict. However, assessing all these results together, the lack of difference
between the experimental and control groups in the levels of contact and relationship
is consistent with the interpretation that the difference in partnering behavior is due to
the income difference rather than another aspect of the parents’ relationship.
Notwithstanding this overall assessment, additional research would be useful.
The effect of economic resources on family structure has been a central focus for
researchers across multiple disciplines, and related concerns have motivated significant
policy interventions over that last two decades. However, relatively little research has
been able to evaluate the causal effect of income on partnering. In addition, much of the
research has not focused on economically disadvantaged mothers, who are particularly
likely to be constrained by economic factors and who are subject to the most intense
policy interventions. Finally, few studies have differentiated types of cohabitation, a
distinction that has been shown to be potentially important (Cherlin and Fomby 2004)
and that is increasingly relevant given demographic trends. This article, taking advan-
tage of a unique random-assignment experiment, allows us to address some of these
limitations. The results point to the importance of new understandings of family
structure and new directions for research. If we were to measure only the three
traditional categories of partnering status—married, cohabiting, or single—we would
fail to capture the full effects of increased resources. Only when the distinction is made
between cohabitation with a biological father and cohabitation with a social father do
we see a more precise effect of increased resources and a way in which they enable
mothers to be more independent. This empirical support for an independence effect is
relatively rare (e.g., Burstein 2007) and suggests that research on the effect of resources
in the new demographic context is important.
Additional research is needed to test these findings further and address the limita-
tions of this analysis. Although low-income families are of particular interest to
policymakers, the question of the relationship between income and family formation
is of broad importance and requires analysis of potential differential effects across the
distribution of income. Similarly, additional research identifying the causal effects of
child support income (for resident parents) and child support payment obligations (for
nonresident parents) on partnering is increasingly important given the growth in the
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scope and effectiveness of the child support enforcement system for middle-income
families. Moreover, while the experimental evaluation of this child support policy
provides an unusual opportunity to evaluate the impact of an exogenous change in
income on partnering, it is possible that changes in child support income, or child
support pass-through policy, have different effects than would be generated by a change
in another income source. More research to evaluate potential differential effects would
clearly be useful.
The well-being of children living in low-income families is a central concern of
social policy. Income support policies for families with children have undergone a
remarkable transition (Moffitt and Scholz 2010). The last decade has seen a substantial
expansion in public programs explicitly designed to foster marriage (Wood et al. 2012),
and recent initiatives more closely integrate efforts to improve earnings, child support
outcomes, and relationship quality (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of Child Support Enforcement 2012; Wood et al. 2012; Zaveri and Hershey
2010). These policy initiatives further highlight the importance of understanding the
role of economic resources in shaping family formation decisions and related outcomes.
Our key finding is that increased resources reduce the likelihood of living with a social
father. This is consistent with the theory suggesting that disadvantaged mothers who
gain extra resources are less likely to need to partner with a new man for purely
economic reasons, which may have positive consequences for children’s well-being
(Cherlin 2009). Importantly, in this research, the increased independence does not show
itself in decreased marriage, lending support to the idea that some policies can increase
economic support for vulnerable families without discouraging marriage.
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